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ABSTRACT We present DooDB, a doodle database containing data from 100 users captured with a touch
screen-enabled mobile device under realistic conditions following a systematic protocol. The database
contains two corpora: 1) doodles and 2) pseudo-signatures, which are simplified finger-drawn versions of
the handwritten signature. The dataset includes genuine samples and forgeries, produced under worst-case
conditions, where attackers have visual access to the drawing process. Statistical and qualitative analyses of
the data are presented, comparing doodles and pseudo-signatures to handwritten signatures. Time variability,
learning curves, and discriminative power of different features are also studied. Verification performance
against forgeries is analyzed using state-of-the-art algorithms and benchmark results are provided.
INDEX TERMS Graphical password, doodle verification, pseudo-signature.
I. INTRODUCTION
The pervasive presence of touchscreens in entertainment
devices, tablets, and mobile phones has led to new interac-
tion capabilities. One of them is user-authentication based
on graphical passwords, a topic that has been the subject
of active research as a replacement of alphanumerical pass-
words [1], [2]. The term ‘‘graphical password’’ refers to many
different graphical authentication methods, which can be
broadly classified in three categories: 1) recall, 2) recognition,
and 3) cued-recall passwords. Recall-based systems assume
that users remember a graphical password during authenti-
cation. Recognition systems present graphical information to
the user during authentication, from which the user has to
perform a selection matching a set of information previously
memorized. Cued-recall systems are a hybrid between the
two aforementioned, providing graphical cues that help users
recall the previously learned password. An extensive survey
of graphical password algorithms has been compiled in [1].
In the present work we focus in doodle-based passwords,
which are a subset of recall graphical passwords. Individuals
are authenticated by using a drawing or sketch, that is cap-
tured on a touchscreen during enrollment and is used after-
wards for verification. Due to their graphical nature, they are
in general easier to remember than classical alphanumerical
passwords or PIN codes composed of strings of characters
and numbers [3].
It is well known that publicly available databases together
with their associated evaluation protocols make possible that
researchers develop and objectively compare pattern recogni-
tion algorithms on the same benchmark. Experiments carried
out using private databases are usually hard to replicate since
database-specific effects, which cannot be reproduced by a
third party, may take place. Unfortunately, there is no such a
public database in the field of doodle-based graphical pass-
words, to the extent of our knowledge. Experiments carried
out in the last years related to doodle verification have used
proprietary databases [4]–[7]. Moreover, in these works there
is no reference to forgeries, since only genuine doodles are
considered.
The main contribution of this work is the presentation
and analysis of DooDB, a doodle and pseudo-signature
database containing data from 100 users. Pseudo-signatures
are doodles based on a simplified version of the user sig-
nature, being thus composed of learned and natural move-
ments. The database has been captured on a handheld device
under realistic conditions. It has two main advantages com-
pared to other databases used in the literature: two acqui-
sition sessions were performed, so inter-session variability
effects can be analyzed, and skilled forgeries are provided
for each user. The DooDB database is publicly available
from the ATVS - Biometric Recognition Group website
(http://atvs.ii.uam.es).
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Another objective of this work is to obtain a baseline
doodle verification performance that can be used to com-
pare this method with current well known authentication
alternatives such as signatures or with future doodle-based
recognition algorithms. We also analyze the differences in
the verification performance between doodles and pseudo-
signatures. Since pseudo-signatures are simplified versions of
real signatures, and thus composed of learned movements, it
can be hypothesized that they present a lower variability and
a better verification performance. The effects of inter-session
variability are also studied.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. II related works
are summarized. In Sect. III the database is described. Quan-
titative and qualitative properties of the database are analyzed
in Sect. IV. Preliminary verification experiments using the
data from DooDB are reported in Sect. V and conclusions are
finally drawn in Sect. VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Several approaches have been proposed in the literature
related to doodle-based user authentication. A survey of the
techniques presented over the last years has been reported
recently in [1].
One of the first contributions in the field is the Draw-A-
Secret system (DAS) [4]. The DAS system implements a grid
where users trace their graphical password. The sequence of
grid cells (5 × 5 in that work) that the users follow is then
stored and used for validation. Users are accepted by the
system only if they follow the same sequence of cells.
The term ‘‘passdoodle’’ was later introduced in [5]. In that
work, the memorability (i.e. the easiness to remember) of
doodles for user authentication is studied, as well as the
user preference towards alphanumeric passwords or doodles.
However, it is a preliminary study carried out with doodles
traced on a sheet of paper by a population of 39 users.
A passdoodle verification system is also proposed in [8].
The stroke spatial distribution and the speed are used for ver-
ification. Experiments are performed with a database contain-
ing doodles from 10 users, providing thus a limited statistical
significance.
A doodle authentication system which uses Dynamic Time
Warping (DTW) for matching is described in [7]. Recogni-
tion performance results are provided using Tamil characters,
instead of doodles.
The Scribble-A-Secret (SAS) scheme for doodle verifica-
tion was later proposed [6]. This system uses edge orientation
patterns as features, extracted from the doodle image (no
dynamic information is used). Experiments are carried out
with doodles from 87 individuals, traced on a Tablet-PC
touchscreen. Forgeries are simulated by comparing doodles
from different individuals.
In [9], a verification scheme based on predefined visual
cues is presented. The cues are chosen by the user with the aid
of a graphical interface. With these cues (which are in general
common shapes), each user creates what is called a pseudo-
signature. Cryptographic keys are then generated from the
pseudo-signatures. Experimental results are reported using a
database of 37 subjects, which includes forgeries.
A graphical password verification system based on a set of
predefined symbols is proposed in [10]. During enrollment,
the user first selects a set of predefined symbols (at least 3)
and then draws them. The set of symbols is considered the
user password. During authentication, the symbols must be
drawn in the same order and are then matched to the pre-
defined templates. If the drawn set is the same as the reg-
istered set, the user is validated. No experimental results are
provided.
A multi-touch authentication approach has been presented
in [11]. In that work, users perform gestures with several
fingers at the same time. Since the gesture used for authen-
tication is produced with all the fingers, the authors claim
that information from the hand geometry is also captured.
Experimental results are reported on a database of 34 users.
The Pattern Lock found in Android OS portable devices
is a widespread graphical password scheme. This method
presents a square grid of 3× 3 points on the screen. The user
must trace a pattern between the points without repeating any
of them. This resembles a simplified version of the Draw-
a-Secret scheme, mitigating the effect of strokes near cell
edges. Only the sequence of points is stored as a password,
so no dynamic information such as speed or duration is
used for verification. Other approaches that also use dynamic
information from the Pattern Lock drawing process have been
proposed [12], [13].
In [14], an authentication scheme based on continuous
touchscreen input, instead of specific gestures, is presented.
Results are reported using a set of 41 users.
A. ATTACKS TO GRAPHICAL PASSWORDS
Doodle-based graphical passwords are vulnerable to two
main types of attacks. Smudge attacks are those produced
when the attacker follows the finger grease path left by the
user on the screen [15]. Shoulder-surfing attacks represent the
case when the attacker gains visual access to the password
drawing process.
In all the aforementioned works, except [9], shoulder-
surfing forgeries (i.e. attacks) are not taken into account
systematically in the experiments, to the extent of our knowl-
edge. Only random forgeries are considered, which is the case
where the attacker claims to be a different user but produces
his or her own doodle to try to access the system. Thus,
doodles from different users are considered as forgeries of
each other, which is a simplified scenario compared to the
case of intentional forgeries.
B. GRAPHICAL PASSWORDS VS. HANDWRITTEN
SIGNATURES
Doodle-based verification can also be seen as a vari-
ant of dynamic handwritten signature verification [16],
since signatures can be acquired using touchscreens. Signa-
ture verification on handheld devices has also been studied
by the authors and is a field which has recently been given
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large attention within biometrics [17]. This wide interest
is shown by the acquisition of the BioSecure Multimodal
Database [18], in which a corpus of signatures was acquired
on a PDA. An international evaluation campaign with signa-
tures captured on that database was organized in 2009, with
the participation of several research institutions [19].
Doodle verification and signature verification share that in
both cases behavioral information (e.g. gesture dynamics) is
used for matching. However, compared to signatures, doodles
are commonly not composed of natural and trained move-
ments that users have performed for several years. While
this may be the source of a larger variability, it is also an
advantage for doodles since, unlike signatures, they can be
easily replaced if necessary (which is known as revocability in
the biometric field). Doodles may also have a higher accept-
ability, since a number of users are reluctant to provide their
digitized signatures in some environments.
III. THE DooDB DATABASE
The DooDB database comprises two subcorpora, each one
containing a different modality:
• Subcorpus 1: Doodles. Participants were asked to draw
with their fingertip a doodle on a handheld device touch-
screen that they would use as a graphical password on a
regular basis for authentication (e.g. instead of the PIN
code). There were no restrictions regarding duration or
shape. In most cases, users invented their own doodle at
the time of acquisition.
• Subcorpus 2: Pseudo-signatures. Participants were
also asked to draw with their fingertip a simplified ver-
sion of their signature, which they would also use as a
graphical password on a regular basis. This could be, for
example, their initials or part of their signature flourish.
The main difference between doodles and this modality
is that in this case, the dynamic process to produce
the drawing is in general composed of natural and well
trained movements.
A. ACQUISITION PROTOCOL
Acquisition was performed using an HTC Touch HD mobile
phone (see Fig. 1). The device has a resistive touchscreen
of 2 × 3.5 in (ca. 5 × 8.5 cm). The x and y coordinates of
the fingertip position are sampled at discrete time values t
at 100Hz when the user presses the screen. The coordinate
values represent milli-inches, so xt values range between
[0, 2000] (width) and yt values between [0, 3500] (height).
The time interval 1t between consecutive samples is also
stored. However, the device has some sampling errors, such
as lost samples or samples that are not captured due to insuffi-
cient pressure. The device assigns [0, 0] coordinate values to
the erroneous samples. To summarize, each drawing is stored
as a sequence of discrete values [xt , yt ,1t ]. Some examples
of doodles and pseudo-signatures are shown in Fig. 2.
The acquisition process was divided in two sessions, sep-
arated by an average period of two weeks. This period was
FIGURE 1. Doodle acquisition setup.
chosen in order to allow enough inter-session variabilitywhile
trying to avoid that users forgot their doodles. Participants
were briefed in the first session about the purpose of the
acquisition. Each modality (doodles and pseudo-signatures)
was explained to them following the same instructions so that
each user received the same information. The donors were
asked to draw with their fingertip on the handset touch screen
holding it in their own hand, simulating thus real operating
conditions. They were allowed to practice their drawings until
they felt comfortable with them.
Forgeries have also been captured in this database. To per-
form forgeries, users had visual access to the doodle or
pseudo-signature they had to imitate. The acquisition soft-
ware replayed the strokes on the screen showing their
dynamic properties (e.g. speed). This animation was shown
to users up to three times, and then they were allowed to train
until they felt confident with their forgery. The usage of the
replay software makes possible to produce forgeries with a
notable degree of accuracy, as can be observed in Fig. 2.
During the two sessions, the same protocol was followed
for each user and modality: 5 genuine samples, then 5 forg-
eries, 5 genuine samples, followed by 5 forgeries and finally
5 genuine samples. This separation in blocks of 5 signatures
allows analyzing intra-session variability. Consequently, at
the end of the two sessions, each user had produced 30 gen-
uine drawings (15 per session) and 20 forgeries. In the first
session, user n produced forgeries for users n− 1 and n− 2,
while in the second, forgeries for users n− 3 and n− 4 were
produced.
B. DEMOGRAPHICS AND MEMORABILITY
The 100 participants in the database present the following age
distribution: 75 are less than 25 years old, 14 are between
25 and 40 years old, and 11 are older. The gender distribution
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FIGURE 2. (a) Example of doodles from the database, classified following the criteria explained in Sect. IV. The doodle on the right is a
forgery of the one on the left. (b) Example of pseudo-signatures from the database. Genuine pseudo-signatures (left), forgeries (middle)
and the corresponding handwritten signature (right) from the BioSecure database [18].
is 44 women and 56 men. It was observed during the cap-
turing process that participants not familiar with touchscreen
devices required a significant longer training time than the
rest. This case was more common in older participants.
A subset of 13 participants of this database have also partic-
ipated in the BioSecure Multimodal Database (BMDB) [18].
In that database, on-line signatures were captured using both
a pen-tablet and a PDA with a stylus. This overlap makes
possible to observe the evolution of signatures from a con-
trolled scenario (signature with ink pen and paper placed on
a pen-tablet), towards more degraded conditions (signature
on a PDA with a stylus) and, finally, the most challenging
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FIGURE 3. Histograms normalized to [0, 1] and box plots of (a) number of intersections, (b) average drawing speed and
(c) duration.
case of pseudo-signature (simplified signature traced with
the fingertip). Some examples of genuine signatures and
their corresponding pseudo-signatures from the same user are
shown in Fig. 2(b).
One of the critical issues in graphical passwords is mem-
orability. During the second acquisition session, it was
observed that approximately 90% of the participants remem-
bered correctly their pseudo-signature. On the other hand,
nearly 40% of the participants had difficulties to recall their
doodle from the first session. Users could request to see the
tracing process of their own drawings from the first session.
This was done by using the aforementioned functionality
designed to train forgers. The high percentage of users that
requested help to recall their doodles is related to the fact that
they did not use them between sessions on a regular basis.
In a real scenario with more frequent use, memorability may
certainly improve.
IV. DATABASE ANALYSIS
A. STATISTICAL PROPERTIES
Given the different nature of doodles and signatures it is
expected that they present differences in their properties such
as their length or graphical complexity. A statistical analysis
of the properties from the two captured subcorpora has been
performed. They have also been compared with the ones
from a BioSecure PDA Signature subcorpus of 120 users
(also captured by the ATVS - Biometric Recognition Group),
allowing thus a comparison between handwritten signatures,
finger-traced pseudo-signatures and doodles. The following
properties have been analyzed: graphical complexity (as the
number of trajectory intersections), average speed and dura-
tion.
In Fig. 3(a), the distribution of the number of intersec-
tions in the drawings is represented. We observe that signa-
tures present a considerably higher number of intersections,
as expected. The difference between doodles and pseudo-
signatures is small in this case. A low amount of intersections
can be associated to low graphical complexity. This lower
complexity indicates that doodles and pseudo-signatures may
be easier to forge.
The stroke average speed distributions are compared in
Fig. 3(b).1 As can be seen, doodles are the ‘‘slowest’’ from the
three datasets. Themain cause for this may be that doodles are
in general newly invented drawings for the participants, while
pseudo-signatures are (or at least contain) previously learned
movements. It can also be observed that pseudo-signatures
are on average also produced faster than signatures. This is
a reasonable result, since the motor process is different for
the production of doodles and signatures. When producing
a signature, the writer moves the stylus with a combination
of his fingers and wrist movements (i.e. the natural writing
process), while in the case of finger-drawn sketches, the wrist
is the main motor element, as the finger used for drawing is
kept almost fixed. This way, signatures are based on more
precise movements than doodles, and composed of small
graphical elements compared to pseudo-signatures, which are
produced by faster movements and larger shapes.
In Fig. 3(c), the statistical distribution of the three sets in
terms of their total duration is represented. As can be seen,
handwritten signatures tend to have a higher duration than
the finger-traced drawings. Moreover, signatures present a
higher variability in terms of duration. Doodles also tend
to require more time than pseudo-signatures, which are in
general composed of initials or simplified signature flourish.
B. VARIABILITY ANALYSIS
Three types of variability may increase the error rate of a ver-
ification system. Intra-user variability reflects the difference
between genuine samples of the same user. Inter-user vari-
ability represents the variance between samples of different
users. Last, inter-session variability is related to the difference
between samples of the same user over time. In general,
1This graph is a corrected version from the one presented in [20], which
had an erroneous scaling for the signature duration histogram.
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TABLE 1. Verification performance in terms of EER (%) using samples from different sessions for authentication. EERsk refers to the EER for skilled
forgeries and EERrd for random forgeries.
verification performance will be best if intra-user and inter-
session variability are low and inter-user variability is high.
An analysis of the three variability classes in DooDB is
carried out in this section. A simple DTW-based verification
system trained with the 5 first samples from session 1 is
implemented [21], using three pairs of features: the coor-
dinate sequence [x, y], the speed sequence, [x ′, y′] and the
acceleration sequence [x ′′, y′′].
Skilled and random forgeries are considered. To compute
skilled forgery scores, the 20 available forgeries per user are
employed. Random forgeries represent the case where a user
claims to be a different one while providing his or her own
doodle or pseudo-signature to the system. Random forgery
scores are obtained by comparing the user reference set to
the first genuine signature sample from each of the remaining
users.
The verification performance for the three feature pairs
is shown in Table 1 using separately genuine samples from
session 1 and from session 2 as test samples. In the case of
Session 1, the 10 remaining samples are used for verification
(since the first 5 are used for training), while for session 2, all
15 samples are used for verification.
The score distributions of genuine samples from session 2,
random forgeries and skilled forgeries are represented for
each modality and for each feature pair in Fig. 4. The
Equal Error Rates (EERs) of these systems is also shown in
Table 1.
Several observations can be made from Fig. 4 and Table 1:
1) INTRA-USER VARIABILITY
In Fig. 4, we observe that the genuine score distribution for
doodles presents a long tail towards low scores. This effect
reflects the presence of users who vary significantly the aspect
or the dynamics (including stroke order) of their doodles.
The highest intra-user variability (i.e. themost spread genuine
score distribution) is observed for the acceleration features on
doodles, which reflects the variation not only in the doodle
aspect but also in the dynamics between different sessions.
This indicates that in general users concentrate in reproducing
the shape of their own doodles, but tend to vary the speed
and acceleration of their strokes. The effect is reduced with
pseudo-signatures, since generally these are based on better
learned movements, and is clearly minimized for signatures,
which are the best trained passwords of the three categories.
2) INTER-USER VARIABILITY
Regarding random forgeries, it can be observed in Fig. 4 that
random forgery score distributions for doodles are shifted
significantly towards lower scores, compared to pseudo-
signatures and signatures. This is especially visible for the
[x, y] feature pair, revealing a higher inter-user variability, at
least in shape, for doodles. This is not reflected in a lower EER
in Table 1, since the tail towards lower scores for the genuine
score distribution overlaps with forgery scores. When skilled
forgeries are considered, inter-user variability is inversely
related to the easiness of forging samples from another user.
As can be seen in Fig. 4, there is a high overlap between
skilled forgeries scores and genuine user scores for doodles.
Skilled forgery scores decreasewhen dynamic features (speed
and acceleration) are selected. However, since genuine user
scores also decrease for these features on doodles, the overlap
does not decrease significantly nor does the EER (for doo-
dles). A predictable effect is that dynamic features such as
speed and acceleration provide a higher separation between
genuine and skilled forgery scores for signatures since they
are harder to imitate, leading to lower EERs.
3) INTER-SESSION VARIABILITY
As expected, the error rates are higher in every case when
genuine samples from session 2 are used (see Table 1).
We observe that the performance degradation between
sessions for doodles and pseudo-signatures is significantly
higher than for signatures both in relative and absolute terms.
It is also worth noting that the verification performance
against random forgeries is in some cases better for doodles
and pseudo-signatures than for signatures. This suggests a
higher variability in size and shape between users, compared
to signatures. However, the higher error rates against skilled
forgeries also reflects that pseudo-signatures, and especially
doodles are significantly easier to forge.
C. LEARNING CURVE
The learning curve for the three modalities (doodles, pseudo-
signatures and signatures) is studied by analyzing the average
genuine sample duration for each capture block during the
database acquisition. As described in Sect. III-A, during the
database acquisition process, users were asked to draw gen-
uine samples in blocks of 5, separated by the production of
forgeries.
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FIGURE 4. Score distributions for doodles (left), pseudo-signatures (middle) and signatures (right) using different feature pairs.
It can be hypothesized that if the average duration signifi-
cantly decreases between different blocks, the users are still
not used to the acquisition method or they are still learning
how to produce their graphical password. The average dura-
tion for each modality among consecutive blocks is repre-
sented in Fig. 5. The average duration between the first block
and the last block for the case of doodles has a 20%difference,
while for pseudo-signatures and signatures there is a 10%
difference.
These observations corroborate the fact that doodles
were in general specifically created for the experiments
while pseudo-signatures are composed of well-learned
movements.
D. GRAPHICAL AND QUALITATIVE PROPERTIES
When the whole doodle dataset is visually inspected, it can
be seen that there are three main types of doodles:
• Abstract doodles, which cannot be directly interpreted
as representing an object or idea.
• Conceptual doodles, which represent an object or idea
(e.g. a flower).
• Symbolic doodles, which are known and recognizable
symbols, like currency or musical notation.
FIGURE 5. Average genuine sample duration for each capture block
during database acquisition (3 blocks of 5 samples per session).
Doodles that are abstract for an observermay be conceptual
to another that is able to interpret them.However, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that abstract doodles may be more resilient
to forgers with visual access to them, since they are harder
to remember [3]. The proportion of these three doodle types
in the DooDB database is: 43 abstract, 37 conceptual, and
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TABLE 2. Verification performance in terms of EER (%) using samples from session 2 for authentication. EERsk refers to the EER for
skilled forgeries and EERrd for random forgeries.
20 symbolic doodles, although this is based on a subjective
evaluation. It has also been observed some repetitions among
the doodles provided by participants, specially for common
drawings. Some examples of repeated doodles are a flower
symbol and a smiling face. Examples of each type of doodle
are shown in Fig. 2.
Regarding pseudo-signatures, a clear classification
between different types cannot be established. It is observed
that most participants tend to produce a simplified version
of the signature, including flourish. However, approximately
20% of the participants have written their initials, their name
or a shortened version of their name without flourish.
V. BENCHMARK RESULTS
In order to assess the authentication performance based
on doodles and pseudo-signatures, preliminary experiments
have been carried out. A simple verification system, based
on Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) to compare the captured
time sequences has been used, following the algorithm as
described in [21].
Two representative local feature sets from the state of the
art are studied in this benchmark. First, the one from the
doodle authentication system proposed in [7]. In that system,
6 local features are extracted from the doodle trajectory.
These are the coordinate sequence [x, y], and its first and sec-
ond derivatives (speed and acceleration). Thus, each doodle is
described by the 6-dimensional sequence [x, y, x ′, y′, x ′′, y′′].
Matching is performed using the DTW algorithm.We refer to
this feature set as HP-LOCAL.
The other system is based on the one presented by the Bio-
metric Recognition Group - ATVS to the BioSecure Signature
Evaluation Campaign BSEC 2009 [19]. In particular, the
system is the one based on DTW that was tuned to maximize
its performance against skilled forgeries, identified as system
‘‘DTWs’’ in [19]. It was one of the best performing systems
in most evaluation scenarios against skilled forgeries. This
feature set is referred to as ATVS-BSEC. The system extracts
the following 7 local features:
• x-coordinate, x
• Second-order derivative of x-coordinate, x ′′
• First-order derivative of y-coordinate, y′
• Second-order derivative of y-coordinate, y′′
• Path velocity, υ = √(y′)2 + (x ′)2
• First-order derivative of path velocity, υ ′
• First-order derivative of the log curvature radius, ρ′,
where ρ = log(υ/θ ′) and θ = arctan(y′/x ′) is the
curvature of the position trajectory.
A. EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL
The experimental protocol follows the one described in
Sect. IV-B, but only genuine signatures from session 2 are
used for authentication.
The whole sets of doodles and pseudo-signatures from
the DooDB database are used for the experiments. The first
5 genuine samples from the first session of each user are
used for enrollment as reference templates. The 15 gen-
uine signatures of the second session are used to compute
genuine user scores, simulating thus real operating condi-
tions, in which inter-session variability affects the verification
performance.
Random and skilled forgery scores are obtained following
the same protocol described in Sect. IV-B.
For each comparison against the 5 reference templates,
an output score is generated by averaging the inverse of the
5 DTW distances obtained.
B. RESULTS
The verification performance in terms of Equal Error Rate
(EER) is shown in Table 2 and DET (Detection Error Trade-
off) curves for each dataset are represented in Figure 6.
As can be seen, the performance is higher (i.e. lower error)
for pseudo-signatures compared to doodles both for random
and skilled forgeries.
Comparing Table 2 (which considers state-of-the-art fea-
ture sets) to the results shown in Table 1 using only
samples from session 2 (with simple feature pairs) for ver-
ification, we can see that the performance is similar. This
is an indication that the selected state-of-the-art feature sets
may not be totally adequate for doodles, and better perfor-
mance may be achieved by considering feature extraction
adjusted to the doodle recognition problem. This is subject to
future work.
In Table 1 we also saw that the performance against skilled
forgeries improved for pseudo-signatures when dynamic
properties (i.e. speed or acceleration) were used. This effect
may be due to the higher consistency in the drawing process
of pseudo-signatures, since they are composed in general
of natural or learned movements. On the other hand, when
doodles are considered, the usage of speed or acceleration
properties does not increase the performance in the same
proportion. This may be due to an increased variability in the
drawing process. In fact, it was observed during the doodle
subset acquisition, that some users varied the stroke order of
their doodles even in the same session. This was not the case
for pseudo-signatures.
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FIGURE 6. DET plots for (a) doodles, (b) pseudo-signatures and (c) signatures.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The DooDB database has been presented. This database com-
prises doodles and pseudo-signatures from 100 users and
skilled forgeries for all of them. The acquisition protocol
has been described and various data analyses have been
performed. Benchmark verification experiments have been
carried out, revealing that one of the main challenges of doo-
dle and pseudo-signature verification may be the protection
against forgeries.
We have also observed that there is a high intra-user vari-
ability in the production of doodles, which negatively affects
the verification performance. Unlike the case of signature
verification, where dynamic features such as acceleration of
velocity clearly increase the verification accuracy [16], the
variability found in doodles defies the utility of dynamic
features for doodle-based authentication. On the other hand,
pseudo-signatures aremore stable and thus provide promising
results. Users may produce doodles more naturally over time,
assuming a frequent usage, leading to an improvement in
their verification performance which would become closer to
pseudo-signatures in the long term.
Based on the results, doodles and pseudo-signatures are
seen as a potential lightweight authenticationmethod oriented
to mobile devices. One of the main advantages of this kind
of graphical password is its convenience and the possibility
of performing user authentication without extra hardware
unlike, for example, fingerprint authentication. As previously
stated, revocability is an advantage of doodles with respect to
other biometric traits.
Future work includes the analysis of the impact of doodle
complexity in the performance against skilled forgeries, and
the identification of feature sets specifically tuned for doodle
verification. Additionally, the impact of each kind of doodle
(symbolic, abstract or conceptual) in the quality of forgeries
is also source for future research.
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